The Future of Iraq and the Middle East

There are so many imponderables facing future developments in the Middle East that it would be rash indeed for anyone, however close to the region, to commit himself to more than a few "maybes" and "perhapses." Furthermore, given the pace at which events are moving, the picture may have changed very markedly by the time this article reaches its readers.

Some things, however, are fairly certain. The first is that the events of the last few months have affected the Middle East to an extent comparable only with the redrawing of the map of the region after the First World War, or with the creation of Israel in 1948. Secondly, the United States is apparently more inextricably involved in the affairs of the region than at any other time this century. Finally, the next few months provide an almost unique opportunity to initiate and promote lasting peace and stability in this area. Whether this opportunity will be seized or wasted is, of course, another matter.

The war in the Gulf was never entirely inevitable, and there are various aspects of it that have intensely worrying implications. Of course it was not, or was only partially, a crusade to liberate Kuwait, laudable as that objective was. Its real purpose, which itself was also not unworthy, was to restrain and, if possible, remove an apparently overmighty Saddam Hussein, against the background of a new world context in which the Soviet Union is not in a position to make significant objections to moves of this kind initiated by the United States. One serious casualty of recent events has been the authority of the United Nations, since the episode has tended to underline that organization's domination by the United States and has damaged, at least somewhat, its reputation for neutrality and evenhandedness. In addition, the extent to which Iraq's infrastructure was destroyed, and the manner in which Iraq's retreating army was attacked, has raised questions about whether or not the U.S. military used excessive force. On the other hand, Saddam Hussein's personal responsibility for the devastation he has brought upon his own people cannot be denied; after all, he could have withdrawn from Kuwait easily.

My guess is that, unless the United States takes the entirely perverse view that it is somehow "safer" to keep him in power, Saddam Hussein's days are numbered. There really is little hope for any long-term reconciliation within Iraq or for stability in the region as a whole unless he is overthrown. Much of northern Iraq, including the Kirkuk oil fields, which account for about one-third of Iraqi oil production, is under the control of Kurdish forces, and many deserters from the regular army in the north have joined them. In addition, much of the population of southern Iraq has also risen in revolt, although how effectively remains to be seen. Undoubtedly, there will be fierce fighting and more terrible brutality on the part of Saddam Hussein's forces before his regime is overthrown, but, short of a major injection of outside assistance, it is difficult to see how he can survive.

The major problem will be the sheer mechanics of how this is to be done; Saddam Hussein is well aware of the fate of Ceaucescu and will hold out in his bunker for as long as possible, certainly as long as he thinks the United States will acquiesce in his doing so. Although there is a great deal of opposition to the regime within the country, the population has been unable to mobilize politically for many years and has also been cowed by an all-pervading-reign of terror--which partly explains the incoherent and uncoordinated nature of the uprisings so far. On the other hand, the devastation of the country's infrastructure and its key industries (particularly those associated with or deriving from the oil industry) undermines the foundations of Saddam Hussein's power in the sense that the regime is no longer in a position to purchase popular acquiescence or support; the carrot is gone and only the stick is left.

Possible Scenarios

It is fairly safe to predict what is not likely to happen in Iraq after Saddam Hussein's fall. One of the unlikely scenarios that seems to be concerning the United States administration at the moment is the seizure of power by an exclusively "Shiite government." Here the experience of the Iran-Iraq war should suffice to convince any observer that the Iraqi Shiites are primarily Iraqi (or Arab) rather than Shiite in their sympathies and that few would be in favor of an Islamic Republic of Iraq. Furthermore, the influence of the Shiite clergy in Iraq is relatively limited and in no way comparable with the authority of their counterparts in Iran. Fortunately, the more important Iraqi Shiite opposition politicians are perfectly aware of this, and are also aware that any association with or active cooperation from Iran (apart from food and other humanitarian aid) would be both counterproductive and damaging to their cause. It was made quite clear at a historic meeting of the Iraqi opposition in Beirut in early March that the Shiite clergy seek to build a working partnership with the secular parties rather than to dominate any future Iraqi government.

The other unlikely scenario is a "Lebanonization" of Iraq in which the country becomes split into spheres of influence controlled in some fashion by a combination of Iran, Syria, and Turkey. Taking each of these states in turn, Iran's steadfastly neutral attitude in a war that Saddam Hussein was trying to convince the entire Muslim world was a conflict between "Islam" and "unbelief" shows two important things. In the first place, it is clear that President Rafsanjani is a pragmatic realist who knows that his own survival depends on keeping religious radicals within Iran at bay. Secondly, with the Iranian economy is ruins and with over half the population living below even the most conservatively defined poverty line, he and his colleagues also know that Iran's recovery depends on a normalization of relations with the United States and Western Europe. Rafsanjani is not going to risk throwing away the patient bridge-building he has been engaged in since Khomeini's death by some quixotic and ill-thought-out intervention in Iraq.

The same goes for President Assad of Syria. Syria's economic problems are chronic. In addition, perestroika, glasnost, and the general crisis in which the Soviet Union finds itself mean that the Syrian regime is virtually forced to adopt a more conciliatory and less confrontationist approach. It cannot afford to put itself in a position where it is too exclusively reliant on the Soviet Union. In any case, President Assad has never sought personal hegemony in the region, and, although he would welcome a change of government in Baghdad, it is difficult to estimate how much effort he might expend on ensuring that it should be composed of pro-Syrian Ba'thists. In any case, Syria's chief concerns are with Israel and Lebanon; at the moment, relations with Israel seem to be entering a new if still somewhat unpredictable phase. And, with the removal of General Aoun, a certain uneasy tranquillity has come to Lebanon. Active interference in Iraq at the moment would be fraught with danger, and the successors to Saddam Hussein will have no particular reason to pursue his vendetta against Damascus, although, if a more democratic regime is able to come to power in Baghdad, this will have serious implications for other regimes in the region.

Recent events also seem to indicate Turkey's general unwillingness to become embroiled in Iraq's affairs, and little more has been heard of plans to annex Mosul. Turgut Ozal has made it clear to Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan that he has no objection to Kurdish autonomy within Iraq and has even been showing his preparedness to make concessions towards the Kurds in Turkey. The political realists among the Kurds know that there is little hope of creating a "Grand Kurdistan" and are trying to convince their more euphoric comrades that such talk is largely counterproductive. Turkey, and to a lesser extent Iran, seem to have begun to learn the lesson that short of genocide, the constant suppression of a minority (or, in Turkey's case, a resolute refusal to acknowledge its existence) will not ultimately deflect that minority's attempts to achieve its aspirations, and that concessions and negotiations are likely to be more fruitful. Furthermore, with the sudden removal of the Soviet threat, the Turkish army's main raison d'être is the Kurdish "problem"; if this diminishes appreciably, the necessity for a relatively poor country to maintain an extremely large and expensive military machine will also be reduced, a scenario that Ozal might not find entirely unwelcome.

Thus Iraq's immediate neighbors to the north and east all share an interest in a change of government in Baghdad. As far as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are concerned, they, too, have every interest in Saddam Hussein's removal, although, again, their rulers may be uneasy at the prospect of the emergence of some sort of democracy, however limited, in Iraq after he has gone.

Iraq after Saddam

Let us briefly consider what may happen within Iraq after Saddam Hussein. Three possible avenues seem open. The worst possibility would be a government of ex-Iraqi ministers or soldiers organized and sponsored by Saudi Arabia. As the Saudis are clearly working closely with the United States, this will be recognized immediately as a clumsy attempt to impose an American solution on Iraq (in the name of "strong government") that would have little support within the country. One of the names mentioned as a possible future head of state is Ibrahim al-Dawud, who was minister of defense for two weeks in July 1968, after which he was forced to leave the country; another is General Hasan al-Naqib, who has also been out of Iraq for many years. Any such government would have little chance of success, as well as having no local network. It would find no popular echo within the country and, in any case, would have to build up its own repressive apparatus, given the intense dependence of the existing one on Saddam Hussein personally.

The second possibility is a successful military coup from within the Iraqi armed forces that would result in a senior general or junta of officers taking power. Although the coup leaders would almost inevitably be Ba'thists, there is no inherent reason why such a regime would be as repressive and vicious as that of Saddam Hussein. Whether such an individual or group could evoke support from the population at large is difficult to say unless he or they were to undertake to work towards the third possibility, which is the formation of a government of national reconciliation. This should include elements from all the leading political parties and interest groups in Iraq, most of whom attended the meeting in Beirut in early March. Although this may seem far-fetched, the present conjuncture, and the prospects that it has opened up, could well provide the means of restoring, or perhaps more accurately, of introducing even the most limited form of democracy into Iraq.

Of course, given the complete absence of democratic institutions in Iraq and the fact that over 65 percent of the country's population is under 30, which means that they have no experience of anything other than Ba'thist rule, even such a minimalist demand may appear to be too optimistic. However, the only secure way forward is the installation of some kind of accountable government. If the future government is to be nothing more than a reflection of the regimes now in power in the neighboring states, this will only lead to further chaos in the long run and will be unable to ensure stability and prosperity in Iraq--and beyond Iraq in the region as a whole.

I have laid great stress upon the return, or perhaps more accurately, the installation of democracy in Iraq. This naturally has wider regional implications, since a democratic government in Iraq could not survive if surrounded by regimes wholly antipathetic to it. It is my contention that many of the problems that have been bedeviling the Middle East for the past half century can be traced to three principal causes: external interference in the region's affairs, the apparently endemic decline in living standards (especially over the past two decades), and the absence of accountable governments. These three factors go a long way to explain the rise of political Islam, the constant state of unrest in the area, and the general sense of disillusionment and despair that even the briefest contact with the region reveals.

Since the beginning of the Cold War at the end of the 1940s and especially since Nasser negotiated the first arms deal with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia in 1955, the struggle for the Middle East has been fought out between the two superpowers. It has generally been an unequal battle, since the Soviet Union could never afford to back its clients (variously Egypt, Iraq, and Syria) as wholeheartedly as the United States backed Israel or Iran, but the general effect was, first, to delay or postpone any settlement of the Arab-Israeli question, and secondly to prop up a number of regimes in the area--most of which still exist--whose legitimacy (in the sense of genuine popular backing) is fairly dubious.

The changes that have taken place in the world over the last two or three years mean that, along with other crisis regions, the Middle East will no longer be the scene of proxy battles between the two superpowers, although there are, of course, powers within the region itself that will compete for influence. In addition, the U.S. budget deficit, added to the growing competition from Japan, will almost certainly have the effect of reducing its will, and its capacity, to bail out Israel indefinitely. Probably this would have been the case even if there had been no war in the Gulf, and it is even more the case now that there is no regional power capable of posing a serious threat to Israel. The circumstances, therefore, seem fairly propitious for the beginnings of a determined effort on the United States' part to settle the Arab-Israeli problem.

Readers will have noticed that it is only now that I mention the Arab-Israeli conflict, which is always seen as central to all crises in the Middle East. This is because, while not in any way underestimating its importance, I see it as part of a far wider complex of problems--all of which are related to the virtual absence of accountable governments in the region as a whole. Self-determination for the people of the West Bank and Gaza is vital, it is just as vital for people of Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia--and Kuwait. Poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, the monopolization of power by ruling families or clans and cliques, the oppression and persecution of ethnic or linguistic minorities, and the rise of political Islam are all intimately connected with the absence of democracy as well as the constant frustration of hopes and aspirations for a better life. The rise of so-called Islamic fundamentalism is a movement of rejection; Islam has little to say about the nature of political authority (more than that it should be just and follow Islamic principles), and the notion of an Islamic state in the form that we hear it propounded today does not go back much before the mid-twentieth century. With the virtual collapse of Khomeini's experiment in Iran, there seems little future for political Islam beyond the provision of the machinery for "the collective enforcement of public morals," as one recent commentator has put it.

The introduction of accountable political systems in the Middle East will not solve all the region's problems at a stroke, but none of them can be seriously addressed without it. These are momentous times for the Middle East and for the world; there is a choice of whether to perpetuate the divisions and the miseries of the past decades or to push cautiously, slowly forward for something different. It is time politicians became statesmen and began to think in the long term; it is difficult, but, at the present conjuncture, many things are possible.