KOREA REDUX - The World & I Online Magazine

September Issue

	Editorial
	Current Issue
	The Arts
	Life
	Natural Science
	Culture
	Book World
	Modern Thought

Resources

	17-Year Archive
	American Waves
	Book Reviews
	Ceremonies/Festivities
	Eye on the High Court
	Fathers of Faith
	Footsteps of Lincoln
	Millennial Moments
	Peoples of the World
	Profiles in Character
	Teacher's Guide
	Traveling the Globe
	Worldwide Folktales
	Writers and Writing

Issue Date: JUNE 2000 Volume: 15 Issue: 06 Page: 14

EDITORIAL

KOREA REDUX

The Special Report in Current Issues this month deals with the contemporary situation on the Korean peninsula. Here I will dwell on the origins of the problem. The United States in effect invited the Soviet Union onto the peninsula by establishing the 38th parallel as an area above which Soviet occupation forces would establish control. The Soviets permitted only communist forces to organize politically in the area under its control, leading to the division of Korea.

        Governments in both South and North Korea were committed to unification. While the North was heavily armed by the Soviets, the United States deliberately withheld from the South the types of armor and weaponry that could support a successful invasion. We also placed Korea outside our defense perimeter.
        Although the revisionist historians of the 1960s often argued that the South had attacked first, Khrushchev's memoirs and Soviet documents reveal that Kim Il Sung had received permission from both the Soviet Union and the PRC for the attack. In any event, this was perfectly clear from the factual situation, for the rapid advances of the communist forces would not have been possible in the absence of detailed planning and preparation.
        The attack left President Truman with a difficult set of choices. The Pentagon believed that if either China or the Soviet Union entered the war, the United States could not preserve the South's regime. Intervention against even the North was a risky proposition. The United States had virtually demobilized its armed forces. Henry Wallace had bitterly attacked the Truman administration for an increase from $11 billion to $13 billion in the defense budget. The only forces quickly available would be the skeleton Eighth Army in Japan. It was badly undersupplied. We had only one and one-half divisions in reserve in the States. We feared attacks on Formosa and in Europe. Truman's decision to intervene was one of the most courageous any American president ever took.
        Up to the Inchon landing and its immediate aftermath, Gen. Douglas MacArthur waged a brilliant campaign. His march to the North defies analysis, however. He knew his two top commanders were not speaking and that their forces were widely separated. He knew that contrary to standard military procedures, no line of resistance had been prepared. What ensued was a rout of the U.S. forces when the Chinese intervened, pushing us back toward the tip of the peninsula, such that the Pentagon expected that we would withdraw completely or see our forces captured. Then Gen. Matthew Ridgway relieved MacArthur, brilliantly stabilized the situation, and reached the 38th parallel. Although he could have recaptured the peninsula, at least to the narrow waist, and should have been permitted to do so, by then Truman had lost faith in military projections. Thus, the present division of Korea unfortunately was frozen.
        The immediate political situation in the ROK was democratic but inept. No real improvement in the economic situation occurred until General Park's coup in 1961. Park introduced what is now regarded as the Asian form of capitalism. It was based on an export economy and required repression of labor unions.
        It was quite successful despite its cronyism and eventual corruption, until it mildly imploded two years ago. There is little doubt in my mind that the repression of the unions--which supported cheap exports--led to the rapid rise in productivity and worker income that soon followed. It also made for less political discontent, except among students, and supported strong armed forces that could defend the South.
        The armed forces dictatorship, unlike communist dictatorships, was only mildly repressive. Even though a guest of the government, I criticized a number of its repressions on national television without any complaint. On the contrary, the minister of culture subsequently arranged for my wife to sing on national television. Its social policy was progressive. Its Saemaul program made assistance available to depressed areas, provided that all groups in the area were consulted and all would benefit from use of the money.
        South Korea is now fully democratic. It is led by Kim Dae Jung, who would have been killed by a previous government if not for warnings from the United States. Its economy is now better adapted to the free market, and it has quickly recovered from its recent difficulties.
        Although the United States made a number of mistakes in its Korea policies, Korea is a shining example of enlightened American policy.
        --Morton A. Kaplan
        Editor and Publisher