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The Concept of 'Person' in American Legal Theory
| Article
# : |
10371 |
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Section : |
Modern Thought
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| Issue
Date : |
12 / 1986 |
5,877 Words |
| Author
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Jude P. Dougherty
Jude P. Dougherty is the dean of the Department of Philosophy
at the Catholic University of America. |
In a sense, there is no such thing as American legal theory. Like science, legal theory transcends national boundaries. The legal theory regnant in the United States has plural origins with deep roots in classical and medieval philosophy and more immediate sources in the British common law.
To seek the roots of the current legal meaning of 'person' is to open the history of Western political thoughts, for it is the political theory of a given period that gives flesh to the term. My approach consequently will be both historical and philosophical.
Greek and Roman sources of the Western concept of person are well known. Boethius' famous definition has been repeated ever since the sixth century when in the context of a discussion of the Trinity he defined person, using Aristotelian terminology, as a supposit of a rational nature. Throughout most of Western history, discussions of the concept of person have usually taken place within a philosophical or theological context. This remained unchanged until the twentieth century, when a shift occurred from the ontological to the psychological--a shift reflected in the dicta of the courts as they began to place more confidence in psychology and the social sciences than in philosophical discussion. Given this sequence of events, to approach the topic historically is to approach it metaphysically, though only up to a point. The distinction between the psychological and the ontological is noted because, as we shall see, which perspective is embraced makes a great deal of difference.
At least five distinct usages of the term 'person' can be identified in American legal theory. The first arises in
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