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Strategic Defense and Arms Control Don't Mix


Article # : 11379 

Section : CURRENT ISSUES
Issue Date : 11 / 1986  2,308 Words
Author : Angelo Codevilla
Angelo Codevilla is a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

       Ever since the mid-1960s, those Americans who have advocated arms control agreements with the Soviet Union have claimed - with consistent success in the struggle for control of U.S. policy - that such agreements are adequate substitutes for a variety of U.S. military measures.
       
        Because of arms control, the advocates of SALT I in 1972 argued, the United States could safely forgo building missiles capable of striking Soviet missiles in their silos and could safely scrap our budding system for intercepting Soviet warheads in fight. The Soviet Union, they added, had also agreed to do without those means of limiting damage to it self. Hence, without effort or expense, but merely through the magic of diplomacy, which had created a stable, perfect condition of mutual vulnerability, we would be safer than we would have been had the United States built damage-limiting weapons. Such weapons would necessarily have been imperfect. Our safety would have rested on whatever edge in weaponry we might have managed to acquire for ourselves. But arms control promised perfect safety grounded on the broad bedrock of total mutual vulnerability.
       
        By the late 1970s, however, it became increasingly difficult to deny what Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger finally said explicitly in December 1984: that the Soviets had built "precisely the kinds of military forces that we had entered into arms control agreements in order to avoid." Specifically, whereas in 1972 the Soviet Union had had only 300 warheads that it could use to destroy U.S. missiles in their silos, thereby limiting damage to itself, by 1980 that number approached 6,000. Whereas in 1972 the Soviet Union was not ringed by modern, large phased-array readers capable of managing a defense against ... (1998 of 14038 Characters)
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