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Afghanistan: The Case for Continued U.S. Aid
| Article
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14533 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
3 / 1988 |
3,667 Words |
| Author
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Sean D. Naylor
Sean D. Naylor, a free-lance journalist based in Boston,
recently spent two months in Pakistan and Afghanistan. |
Eight years after Soviet tanks rolled into Kabul, the Soviets have become bogged down in a vicious war of attrition with the Afghan mujahideen, partisan guerrillas whose hatred of the invaders is matched only by their fierce allegiance to the Islamic faith.
Faith alone, however, could not have sustained the guerrillas during their jihad (holy war). The mujahideen have also been the recipients of what has been described as the most expensive American covert aid program ever (with the exception of the Laos campaign). By the end of 1986, the CIA had channeled an estimated $1 billion worth of arms and ammunition to the guerrillas.
Many observers believe the increased effectiveness of the Afghan resistance led the Soviets to seek a negotiated end to the conflict. After protracted UN-sponsored talks, the Soviets have said they hope to withdraw their troops in 1988--if the United States cuts off its aid to the freedom fighters. Secretary of State George Shultz has indicated the United States may do just that, even before the final Soviet withdrawal is completed.
The U.S. aid program in Afghanistan has always been controversial. CIA sources refer to the covert operation as "daring" and "topnotch" and point to the Soviets' inability to completely subjugate the Afghans as evidence of the aid's effectiveness. Independent observers and mujahideen sympathizers, however, have criticized the program as being inadequate and inefficient, and they have accused the CIA of supplying the guerrillas with only enough aid to fight and die--not enough to win.
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