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Tokyo and the Koreas
| Article
# : |
14890 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
Date : |
10 / 1988 |
2,101 Words |
| Author
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Hong N. Kim
Hong N. Kim is professor of political science at West Virginia
University. |
The security of South Korea has long been a matter of substantial importance to Japan, not just for military reasons but for a full range of political, economic, and cultural considerations. In the famous Nixon-Sato joint communiqué of 1969, Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato declared that the security of the Republic of Korea (ROK) was "essential" to Japan's own security. Although Stato's successors have slightly modified the so-called Korea clause of the 1969 joint communiqué, such a modification in no way has changed the basic proposition that the security of Korea is vital to Japan's own security, for the obvious reason that the renewal of conflict in Korea would have a more serious impact on Japan that on any other Asian nation.
In view of its existing security arrangements with United States, Japan would be drawn into the conflict, either directly or indirectly. Further more, in view of the two Koreas' existing ties with the superpowers, such a conflict could escalate into a major nuclear confrontation imperiling Japan's security.
No less troublesome to Japanese conservative leaders is the prospect that a conflict might result in the conquest of the south by the North. The communization of South Korea would create serious problems for Japan, eliminating a valuable buffer zone between Japan and its potential adversaries and bringing the nation face to face with an unfriendly neighbor with more than one million men under arms. In short, a communist takeover of South Korea would entail drastic changes in Japan's strategic environment.
To be sure, a truly neutral, unified Korea not closely affiliated with any of the major powers
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