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An Uncertain Future for SDI
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15128 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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| Issue
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4 / 1989 |
3,639 Words |
| Author
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Colin S. Gray
Colin S. Gray is president of the National Institute for
Public Policy in Fairfax, Virginia. His most recent book is
The Geo-politics of Super Power. |
There can be no doubt that with the departure from the White House of Ronald Reagan, the father of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the quality of blessing for this endeavor from the highest level will diminish markedly. But those who are speculating that, in the Bush era, strategic defense will be just another defense program are almost certainly wrong. For good or ill, strategic defense has enjoyed, or suffered from, a very special status since the mid-to-late 1960s.
For reasons that far transcend the scope of this essay, strategic defense has been defined as the leading challenge to the stability of deterrence. Fears of strategic defense have been alleged to drive the strategic arms race and have been predicted to raise the risks of war by generating dangerous instabilities. Stability, so the orthodox creed of the arms control illuminati has maintained, reposes in assuredly invulnerable offensive weapons and assuredly vulnerable societies (see Jerome H. Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age, 1975).
Reagan put strategic defense on the front burner of policy debate, relegitimized the idea of active defense, and blessed a program of research and development that caught the Soviets' attention as nothing else has in the past two decades. But the Regan administration failed to achieve a strategy consensus on the value of SDI and, in part as a consequence, failed to build a political consensus adequate for the serious revision of, let alone the U.S. withdrawal from, the ABM Treaty of 1972.
Reagan surprised the world and most of his advisers on March 23, 1983, by challenging the U.S. defense-scientific community to see if they could find
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