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A Missed Opportunity in Panama
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15420 |
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Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
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12 / 1989 |
1,781 Words |
| Author
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Michael G. Wilson
Michael G. Wilson is the director for Latin America and the
Caribbean at the Washington, D.C.-based International
Republican Institute. |
Early in October, the United States was presented with a rare opportunity to help depose Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega, Panama's infamous narco-dictator. Despite having advance warning that an anti-Noriega coup was imminent in Panama and that some U.S. assistance would be welcome, Washington failed to act, citing insufficient intelligence about the operation. Some feel that the United States once again snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in Central America. The administration, however, contends that if the coup attempt could be replayed, the U.S. response would remain the same.
On the morning of October 3, several hundred troops in opposition to Noriega's continued outlaw rule seized the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) headquarters, apprehending the military strongman in the process. Despite early indications that the coup might succeed, a pro-Noriega countercoup managed to regain control by midafternoon.
The decision by Washington to refrain from using its 12,000 highly trained U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) forces paved the way for Noriega loyalists to mount their bloody siege and retake the PDF headquarters. This resulted in the death of rebel leader Maj. Moises Giroldi Vega and at least nine of his allies. The apparent lack of a U.S. contingency plan for responding to such an event, combined with indecision, miscommunication, and confusion by U.S. personnel both in Panama and Washington, helped turn this potentially successful coup against Noriega into the latest in a continuing series of U.S. foreign policy blunders in Central America.
High Stakes In
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