|
|
|
|
|
|
Resources |
|
|
|
The Challenge of Sino-Soviet Detente
| Article
# : |
15978 |
|
|
Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
|
| Issue
Date : |
7 / 1989 |
2,628 Words |
| Author
: |
Donald S. Zagoria
Donald S. Zagoria is professor of government at Hunter College
and a consultant to the National Security Council. |
The new détente between the Soviet Union and China, symbolized by the mid-May summit meeting between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese communist leader Deng Xiaoping, raises three questions: What has brought it about? What are its limits? And what are its implications for the United States?
Changing Soviet policies toward China have been one factor instrumental in bringing about the new détente. Gorbachev has shown more flexibility in dealing with China than did any of his predecessors. For one thing, he accepted in principle the Chinese position in the dispute over the Amur River border: namely, that the main channel should be taken as the Sino-Soviet boundary. This concession led to a revival of border talks, which had been suspended for many years, and has raised the possibility of a break-through in the border dispute. Gorbachev has also made systematic concessions on China's three declared obstacles to normalization of Sino-Soviet relations by withdrawing from Afghanistan, promising to withdraw 200,000 troops from the eastern USSR, and pressuring Vietnam to leave Cambodia. The Soviet leader has also said that the USSR would pull three-quarters of its troops from Mongolia. Thus, in terms of the long-standing border dispute and the security environment, there has been a substantial easing of tensions because of changing Soviet policy.
Breathing space
A second factor instrumental in bringing about the Sino-Soviet détente is China's changing view of the Soviet Union. From the late 1960s until the early 1980s, China regarded the Soviet Union as both the greatest and most imminent threat to its security. In more recent years,
... (2000 of 16428 Characters)
Read Full Article
|
|
