|

|
|
|
|
|
Resources |
|
|
|
Democracy Soviet Style
| Article
# : |
16173 |
|
|
Section : |
CURRENT ISSUES
|
| Issue
Date : |
6 / 1989 |
2,199 Words |
| Author
: |
Rolf Theen Rolf Theen is a professor at Purdue University. |
With the national elections on March 26, 1989, Mikhail S. Gorbachev has achieved another important milestone in his quest for change in the Soviet Union.
In a very real sense, those elections create a foundation for any future political reforms. In addition to having created a new supreme body of state power (the 2,250-member Congress of People's Deputies) and established the Soviet Union's first standing parliament (the 542-member USSR Supreme Soviet), these reforms envisage the emergence of a new and powerful presidency.
The ultimate result of true political reform would be the creation of a new power center, as a counterweight to the Communist Party (CPSU). To Gorbachev's great disappointment and consternation, the CPSU has not only failed to find solutions to the country's problems, but has in fact become very much a part of the problem. In short, the CPSU needs restructuring; and that, as the general secretary well realizes, is a long-term proposition even under the best of circumstances.
In spite of the massive personnel changes and institutional reorganization that Gorbachev has engineered within the party during the past four years, the CPSU has proved to be anything but a pliable instrument in the pursuit of perestroika. On the contrary, Gorbachev has frequently complained about apathy, inertia, and resistance within the party. His mobilization of societal forces outside the CPSU and his decision to create a powerful executive presidency bespeak his conclusion that perestroika cannot wait until the CPSU reforms itself. At a different level, the elections reflect the conclusion that economic reform is not possible without
... (1992 of 13872 Characters)
Read Full Article
|
|