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Law and Natural Law
| Article
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17866 |
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Section : |
EDITORIAL
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| Issue
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3 / 1990 |
845 Words |
| Author
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Morton A. Kaplan
Editor and Publisher |
The March special section in Currents in Modern Thought deals with the concept of justice. I will deal briefly with one of the issues raised in this section by Professor Hittinger, the issue of natural law and human nature. As Hittinger recognizes, natural law advocates face a daunting task. Apart from the developments in modern science which cast serious doubt upon the concept of universal law, the advocates of natural law have never presented any reasonable method for determining what natural law is. Moreover, because human nature is not think-like but disposition, it cannot be examined even in principle apart from the context in which it manifests itself. Therefore, no perdurable concepts can be applied to it except truistic or vacuous ones.
I have argued elsewhere that the concept of human nature is meaningful if treated dispositionally, and I therefore agree that it is desirable for law to take into account what human nature is in context. However, it is undesirable for the Court, rather than the legislature, to take the lead in this process. That would produce a subversion of the democratic process by an unelected and permanent elite. Moreover, the Court's history reflect6s little credit upon it in these respects.
Let me specify how the Court should have handled some of the cases to which Hittinger refers. Brown v. the Board of Education should have been decided on the simple ground that segregation of schools by race violated procedural due process because no appropriate rational distinction supported the move. It did not matter whether blacks did less well in segregated schools but only that no reasonable criterion of assignment had been applied. However, segregation of schools by sex would be within the appropriate police
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