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The Persian Gulf Crisis
| Article
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18309 |
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Section : |
EDITORIAL
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| Issue
Date : |
10 / 1990 |
788 Words |
| Author
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Morton A. Kaplan
Editor and Publisher |
President Bush has moved with consummate skill in the Persian Gulf crisis. He has organized a virtually universal combine, including the Soviet Union, against Saddam Hussein. The swift dispatch of American military to Saudi Arabia has closed the window on a successful Iraqi strike against Saudi Arabia, except at a price the Iraqi strongman is extremely unlikely to be willing to pay. The movement of Arab forces south of the Kuwaiti border has convicted Iraq of the “crime” of bringing Western military forces into the Arab area. The facts that Iraq depends on external sources for 80 percent of its food and that the Baath regime of Saddam Hussein depends upon the ruthless use of force to maintain internal control place great pressure on him to end the crisis.
Saddam Hussein made two major mistakes. The first was to underestimate the willingness of the United States to intervene subsequent to the Iraqi fait accompli in Kuwait. The second was to reject the territorial and oil deal that the Arab conference in Cairo offered. But despite the mistakes made by Saddam Hussein and the professional performance by President Bush, the situation has not been entirely one-sided.
Saddam Hussein's failure to anticipate the American response may have been a product of our appeasement of Iraq. Our criticism of his gassing of Iranians and of Iraqi Kurds did not lead to any lessening in our supply of military equipment or economic credit to Iraq. No doubt, we did not want Iraq to lose to the Iranians because of the instability this might have produced in the Middle East. But our failure to punish him to deter future horrendous acts was not to our credit. When Iraqi Kurds in the United States picketed the Iraqi Embassy to protest the unprovoked gas
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