Issue Date: 9 / 2005

Promoting Democracy Won't Necessarily Produce Peace

Toward the end of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson (1856- 1924) promulgated his "Fourteen Points" aimed at expanding democracy to ensure a peaceful world. Click image to enlarge.        Americans are often told that the promotion of freedom and democracy abroad will produce peace. When President Bush said, "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world," in his second inaugural address, he joined a long list of American presidents from Woodrow Wilson to Ronald Reagan who maintained that the triumph of democracy throughout the world will eliminate the prospects for war. They believed, as does Bush, that the aggressive instincts of military dictatorship and theocratic rule cause war while democracies, founded on the principles of the impartial rule of law, free speech, and elected representation promote peace.                The eighteenth-century philosopher, Immanuel Kant, was one of the earliest proponents of democratic peace. He argued that countries with representative governments would behave more peacefully than countries with authoritarian governments, because "if the consent of the citizens is required in order to decide that war should be declared, nothing is more natural than that they would be very cautious in commencing such a poor game…"                On the other hand, authoritarian governments are prone to go to war, because their leaders don't have to bear any of the personal sacrifices that war entails. Kant also believed that countries with democratically elected governments would bind themselves to international law in a kind of "pacific union" in which war with each other would be deemed illegitimate.1                Toward the end of World War I, Woodrow Wilson picked up on this theme by summarizing the war aims of the allies in Fourteen Points that were intended to make World War I the "war to end war" and the world "safe for democracy." His points embraced the principles of self-determination, democracy, free trade, collective security, and a faith in progressive history leading to a better world. Although they served as an effective instrument of propaganda in bringing the war to a close, very few of Wilson's points were included in the Treaty of Versailles, and the United States chose not to participate in the organization created after the war to promote them, the League of Nations.2                The view that the world would be a better and more peaceful place if it consisted of constitutional democracies did not die with Woodrow Wilson. It has remained a constant theme in American politics, most recently expressed by Bush in his second inaugural address when he said, "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."                American academics have also sought to raise the profile of democratic peace theory. Michael Doyle of Columbia University has written, for example, that the historical record promotes the view that democracies never go to war with one another. They are peaceful in their relations with one another because they "exercise democratic caution and are capable of appreciating the international rights of foreign republics."3 The wars they engage in are not necessarily prudent and sometimes the result of miscalculation, but from Doyle's perspective often unavoidable and even acceptable given that they are in response to a political culture concerned about the universal rights of man.                The strength of democratic peace theory is that it helps explain why the alliance system of industrialized democracies, created after World War II, has been so peaceful. It is, for example, almost impossible to imagine a scenario in which Japan would attack the United States or Germany declare war on France, even though both countries did so prior to the formation of the alliance system and their becoming democracies. Within the limited sphere of this alliance system, there has been a high degree of peace, because any challenger to the prevailing political, social, and economic system would have to face not only the state immediately concerned, but the alliance as a whole. In addition, ideology does not divide them and they have a strong incentive to moderate any conflicts of interests because of the political, economic, and social benefits gained by maintaining the system. Under such conditions, security is not the most pressing issue on the foreign policy agenda, and force is not viewed as an effective instrument of policy.                Democratic peace theory also has the advantage that its prescription for the future is hopeful and principled. It therefore makes for very effective propaganda as demonstrated by George Bush's speech and Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. Successive American presidents have mobilized the American public behind their foreign policies by arguing that America's cause is the cause of liberty and peace for all.                There are, however, several problems with democratic peace theory. First, while the recent historical record suggests that democracies don't go to war with other democracies, democratic regimes can and do incite their citizens to go to war, just as authoritarian regimes do. Although Wilson was a proponent of democratic peace, for example, he sent the Marines to Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua to "teach the South American republics to elect good men." America's constitutional system has not prevented it from being in a state of war in one place or another almost continually since 1941.                In addition, it is unrealistic to assume that there will ever be an international system based on ideological uniformity. While democracy is on the rise, this is a relatively new phenomenon, dependent on certain conditions that do not exist everywhere, and are, in any case, subject to change. It is more realistic to assume that in the future, as in the past, there will be constant changes of governments and the ideologies they espouse.                If these two points are correct, it would seem in America's best interest not to become so consumed with the promotion of democracy that it disregards the principle of ideological tolerance. The promotion of ideological conformity, after all, can lead to war without the desired consequences.                The historical record suggests, for example, that military intervention tends not to be compatible with democratization even when the occupying power is supportive of democracy, because democracy, by its very definition, must come from within. Furthermore, the relationship between the occupier and the occupied is unlikely to result in peace, because their interests are not the same. As soon as the occupation is over, the newly independent regime is likely to be highly nationalist, even radical. This is what the Kennedy-Johnson administrations found out in Vietnam, and what the Bush administration, unfortunately, is in the process of discovering in Iraq.                In sum, although democratic peace theory provides the ingredients for very moving speeches, it is unrealistic for the United States to assume it can recreate the world in its own image and build an international system based on ideological conformity. An alternative system, one based on the principle of ideological tolerance, may not be perfect, but it is likely to be a lot more peaceful and in the long run more conducive to the development of democratic governments.                NOTES                1. Immanuel Kant, "Perpetual Peace," in Conflict After the Cold War, Richard K. Betts, ed. (New York, 2002), pp. 103-120.                2. Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People, (New Jersey, 1974), pp. 597-599.                3. Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," in Conflict After the Cold War, Richard K. Betts, ed. (New York, 2002), p. 316.                © 2005 International Journal on World Peace                         Susan Braden is a foreign policy specialist and senior vice president at MarketEdge Consulting. She served in the National Security Council and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Clinton presidency. In 2003, she received the Knight Cross Order of Merit from Poland for her efforts to improve U.S.-Polish relations and assist Poland's entry into NATO. She also received the Secretary of Defense's Medal for Excellence and Medal for Exceptional Civilian Service.